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1. Introduction1 
The aim of the study at hand is to investigate the factors positively (or negatively) af-
fecting and determining the sustainability of development projects in vocational education 
and training. This study is part of a more comprehensive research and evaluation project 
conducted by Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) and funded by 
Federal Ministry of Development Cooperation (BMZ) and is to provide the foundation for 
future technical assistance and donor policy as regards vocational education and training 
at the beginning of the 21st century. 
With the paper at hand we want to provide the basis for an evaluation project which is 
aimed at identifying those factors positively or negatively affecting the sustainability of 
VET-funding in developing countries. We will start from the point of view of each stake-
holder involved in VET in developing countries. 
Our main thesis is that public VET-funding so far is that it is neither targeted at those 
who are in need of public assistance or incentives nor does it reach them. On the con-
trary, public programmes appear to be directed towards those stakeholders who are in a 
position and prepared to fund their vocational education and training by themselves. This 
leads to a windfall profit for the latter and reduces the financial basis of vocational educa-
tion and training because private money is crowded out by public money instead of 
broadening the financial basis of VET. 
Before we come to the economic analysis of those factors affecting individual and em-
ployers cost-benefit analysis we will look at the environment in which this decision takes 
place.  
In the next chapter we will consider some aspects and definitions of the VET-system. 
The context of the individual decision making and that of the employers will be reviewed 
in chapter 3. 
The different opportunities of private and public funding will be reviewed and dis-
cussed in chapter 5, while chapter 4 is directed towards market failure and externalities. 
                                               
 1  This paper is a summary of a project report (Dohmen, 2001) prepared upon request and with financial support by 
GTZ – German Agency of Technical Assistance.  
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2. Characteristics of Vocational Education and Training 
Vocational education and training is not a unique ‘product’ or service, so that this 
chapter is to provide a short overview about some definitions and differentiations.  
2.1 Training related to Target Group 
Grubb and Ryan (1999) favour a distinction according to the type of vocational educa-
tion and training or the level of qualification VET is targeted at. They distinguish between  
1. pre-employment training which aims at preparing (mostly young) people for their 
initial entry into the labour market, 
2. upgrade training, directed to already trained individuals who are prepared for up-
coming (‘more demanding’) tasks or technologies etc., 
3. retraining is for people who have been trained but have lost their jobs and need to 
be trained for a new job or another qualification, 
The level of qualification at which training is aimed has several consequences. For ex-
ample, pre-employment training may have to provide qualifications which are more basic 
for employment while upgrading may include more advanced skills like book-keeping, 
marketing etc. Depending on the level of graduation even pre-employment training may 
be aimed at basic skills like numeracy or reading if it is targeted at people without or with 
just a few years of schooling.  
Such a differentiation seems to be of major importance for several reasons. Firstly, the 
course content is very different according to the level of pre-qualification of the particular 
target group. Secondly, the mode of instruction might be very different and be associated 
with totally different costs and benefits. For example, upgrade training is important for 
the advantaged and proper prospective executives and thus problably related to higher 
rates of returns than e.g. remedial training would be for disadvantaged (Grubb and Ryan, 
1999). This means that the target group of a course will be of relevance for course con-
tent and design but also affect the costs and benefits of VET courses. 
If these differences were neglected the findings of rates of returns and cost-benefit analy-
sis are biased.  
2.2 Training – Modes and Locations of Delivery 
Another distinction of vocational education and training can be made according to the 
mode of delivery. As regards to the scope of our study one could move one step further 
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and rely on the location of delivery. VET can be conducted as: 
1. Private vocational/technical schools/centers – classroom,  
2. Private vocational/technical schools/centers – laboratory,  
3. Private vocational/technical schools/centers – workshops,  
4. Public vocational/technical schools/centers – classroom,  
5. Public vocational/technical schools/centers – laboratory,  
6. Public vocational/technical schools/centers – workshops,  
7. In-company training centers, 
8. In-company on-the-job training (intentional/unintentional), 
9. Inter-company training facilities, 
10. The individual home (as location for distance or correspondence courses).  
Another extension can be introduced which – in case of classroom training – distin-
guishes between public and private training providers. One can assume that the costs and 
possibly also the benefits will differ in dependence from the all these categories men-
tioned in this section. 
2.3 General, firm-specific and transferable Training 
The distinction between general and firm-specific training, introduced by Becker 
(1964), is of major importance for the preparedness of firms to bear the costs of training. 
General training refers to skills which can be applied in many firms. On the contrary, firm-
specific training is of use only for the firm providing it. Thus, while the latter will com-
monly be provided within the firm, the general training can also be provided by (inde-
pendent) training institutions and centers.  
The differentiation between firm-specific and general training has been extended by 
Stevens (1996) who has introduced the term transferable training. That is neither general 
nor firm-specific training but relevant for a certain number of companies, “transferable 
training is defined as training which is potentially of use to some (rather than many) other 
firms” (p. 23). Thus, as most of training provided within the German dual system is occu-
pation-specific it could be seen as transferable training.2 
                                               
 2  In fact, it has to be taken into account that even this distinction is not unambiguous. As particular qualifications 
might be of interest for other occupations or branches as well no clear cut can be drawn e.g. in defining which firms 
or which branches are to contribute to a branch related levy scheme. 
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The general issue for the study at hand is that - in theory - firms will not be prepared 
to bear any of the costs of general training, so that it would have to be financed by the 
trainee. On the contrary, the firms will be prepared to bear at least some of the costs of 
firm-specific training. Summing up, Becker suggests that firms would be the more willing 
to provide training the more it is firm-specific. In this case, he suggests, that employer and 
employee would share the costs. 
It has to be considered that there is no clear demarcation line between all three kinds 
of training, thus we will have to identify possible artificial lines.  
2.4 Formal, informal and non-formal Training 
Another distinction as regards education and training is between formal, non-formal 
and informal vocational education and training. The first is provided within the formal 
public schooling system while non-formal education is delivered outside. Informal educa-
tion (e.g. within the family or at the workplace) might be intended but does not consist of 
a plan, but is provided more "en passant". It is therefore difficult to identify and to take 
into consideration within this study. 
2.5 Summary 
According to the aforementioned topics, Picture 1 combines the level of qualification 
and the mode of delivery. 
If the different kinds and aims of VET presented in this section were not taken into ac-
count appropriately general remarks on the effectiveness or rates of return may prove 
worthless (Chung, 1995).  
Pre-employment Skills Upgrading Retraining
Classification of Training
3. Private vocational/technical schools/centers – workshops, 
4. Public vocational/technical schools/centers – classroom, 
5. Public vocational/technical schools/centers – laboratory, 
6. Public vocational/technical schools/centers – workshops, 
Location of 
Delivery
1. Private vocational/technical schools/centers – classroom, 
2. Private vocational/technical schools/centers – laboratory, 
7. In-company training centers,
8. In-company on-the-job training (intentional/unintenional),
9. Inter-company training facilities,
10. Individuals house, for distance or correspondence courses  
Picture 1: Classification of Training 
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3. Private Costs and Benefits and Private Funding 
The following investigation considers all three (private) stakeholders, i.e. the firms, the 
individuals and the government (see Picture 2).3 We will assume that individuals act on 
the basis of their individual choices which are based on economically rational behaviour.4 
The same will be valid for employers. Furthermore, we will assume that private markets 
will work when firms and or individuals have a strong (economic) incentive to invest in 
VET. We will furthermore assume that the government should act only if markets do not 
work appropriately. In contrast to this assumption, we will find that governments act con-
trary to this approach what is associated with crowding out effects of private investment 
by public incentives. This narrows the financial basis for VET instead of broadening it. 
In the subsequent section the term cost-benefit analysis is used on a broader basis, it 
covers all the costs and benefits, both monetary and non-monetary. It covers therefore 
more than the common rate of return approaches which are too narrow as they rely on 
monetary indicators only. 
Input factors Core Area of Interest Output factors
VET system
Parents
EmployersIndividuals
Economic situation
Labour markets
Markets
Government
Economic
development
Individual factors
Socio-economic
background
Costs
Benefits  
Picture 2: The environment of VET and its stakeholders 
                                               
 3  Employer organisations and unions are also stakeholders, but they are more involved in the administration and or-
ganisation of VET-systems.  
 4  We are well aware that the narrow economic approach is insufficient for the analysis of human behaviour. Therefore, 
we will try to expand this approach by including for example social and psychological factors.  
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Picture 3 shows the relationships between the major stakeholders of VET – in develop-
ing as well as industrialised countries – and their monetary and non-monetary costs and 
benefits.  
Cost-benefit analysis
in-company-training
school/center-based training
Parents
Employers
Individuals Markets
Government
Subsidies
tax rebates
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Maintenance, fees
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Picture 3: Core factors of a cost-benefit analysis of VET 
The major costs of the individuals, especially for center-based VET, are the opportunity 
costs, i.e. the income foregone, and the fees they often have to pay, particularly for pri-
vate institutions. The major part of the costs for maintenance are just expenditure but no 
costs in the common sense as maintenance would has to be covered even without train-
ing. Thus, they are no costs of training. Furthermore, they are covered by the opportunity 
costs because a labourer would finance his livelihood out of his wage payment. Only 
those additional costs which are originally due to training are to be included in the cost-
benefit analysis. The major benefit of an individual due to training is the higher income 
s/he earns because of their higher productivity or of a lower risk of unemployment. Other 
benefits are a better health status and several non-monetary returns.  
The employer's costs are the trainee's income, the costs of trainers etc. and the other 
costs of providing training, such as material, wastage and the (calculated) rent for build-
ings and equipment etc. The trainee's wage is to be imputed only if and so far it is be-
yond his productivity minus the other training costs. The training benefit of the employers 
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is the reduced costs of production which improves the position at the commodity or ser-
vice markets and increases their profit. 
The government incurs the costs of training provision if it is conducted in training cen-
ters and for subsidies and tax incentives for parents, individuals and employers. The major 
benefits stem from higher tax payments and – if established – higher social insurance 
payments and lower unemployment payments etc. Positive external effects increase the 
social returns to VET, e.g. higher growth rates or lower birth rates, improved health status 
etc. If accounting only for the government's return one calculates the fiscal return to 
training while a broader approach covers the social costs and benefits, i.e. the costs and 
benefits to the whole nation. 
The parents are often only considered in relation to their contributions to their chil-
dren's' maintenance and fee payments.5 The major opportunity costs component may be 
the child's contribution to family income even if it is family work. The parents' returns are 
the children's contribution to their retirement income or parents' housing etc. Yet, it has 
to be considered that parental investment in children is rather risky e.g. because of moral 
hazard and the impossibility of diversification. From an economic viewpoint investment in 
children is a rational decision only if a capital market is not established or if parents are 
highly altruistic (Dohmen, 1999).6 
Teachers and instructors are also involved in VET and have their own interests. Thus, 
one might add another cost-benefit analysis. Within this study they are just mentioned for 
completeness. 
It appears possible to identify environments when individuals and employers are willing 
to bear the cost of VET by themselves. We will start with the economic environment and 
then move on to individuals, finally regarding employers. 
The probability that education and training will be financed by private sources, i.e. 
without public assistance, can be assumed to increase with the country region’s economic 
development. The economic development can be measured by per-capita income, gross 
national product (per capita) etc. Furthermore, one can assume that people are more pre-
pared in a growing than in steady or shrinking economy, although this may depend on 
individual factors, such as socio-economical background, the particular VET-program etc.  
Picture 4 relies on some individual issues that may affect the preparedness to bear the 
                                               
 5  In contrast to the trainee, the full parental contribution for maintenance has to be imputed as a cost of training.  
 6  This approach enables us, for example, to analyse the parental decision not to invest in a girl's education if she moves 
to the husband's family after marriage.  
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costs of training by private sources. The general principle of this and the other pictures is 
that private funding can be expected the more we are on the right side of the continuum. 
For example, individuals from a high socio-economic background will be much more pre-
pared to pay for training than someone from a low background. Yet, one should ac-
knowledge that people will most probably opt for higher education if they are from the 
'upper class'; thus the probability of private funding for VET will increase the more we 
move from the lowest socio-economical groups to the 'middle class' and will then de-
crease the more we come to the upper class. I have tried to underpin this assumption by 
darkening the is area in Picture 4. The same assumption may hold as regards the parental 
income. If we refer to the income security, higher security may increase the training. 
socio-economical background low high
– –> +
parental income low high
– –> +
income security of parents no          low high
– –> +
father's education no         primary   secondary VET        tertiary
– –> +
mother's education no         primary   secondary VET        tertiary
– –> +
family size large small
– –> +
occupational status of the father low high
– –> +
occupational status the mother low high
– –> +
trainee's pre-qualification no basic education primary secondary
– –> +
probability to get access to university education high low
– –> +  
Picture 4: The individual background and training finance 
It should be noted that there are more factors affecting the individuals' preparedness 
to pay for training. If we look at a short-term course in evening classes even individuals 
from comparatively low-income families may be prepared to pay the comparatively low 
fees for e.g. service oriented courses. In contrast, if we refer to very expensive long-lasting 
technical courses even people from the upper middle class will possibly not be prepared 
to pay the fees if there is no public assistance aimed at fee reduction. Informal in-
company training may take place more for individuals from the ‘underclass’ than for oth-
ers as it may be associated with some pay and a poor reputation.  
The parents' education and their occupational status, distinguished for father and 
mother, will affect children's education the same way as family size does. As regards the 
individual himself, his pre-qualification and his ability will influence VET. Yet the higher 
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the academic record of an individual the more it will opt for higher education instead of 
VET. 
training pre-employment in-service upgrading
– –> +
quality of training low high
– –> +
information about training programmes no          low good
– –> +
reputation of VET programme/course no          low good
– –> +  
Picture 5: The particular programme and training finance 
Another issue of relevance is the particular program or course an individual refers to 
(see Picture 5). The probability of private funding may be least for pre-employment train-
ing and highest for upgrading while in-service training may be in between. Quality and 
reputation which are not necessarily inter-related will positively contribute to individual 
willingness. A necessary pre-condition for training is that individuals are informed about 
the existence of training programmes and courses. It is quite often mentioned that indi-
viduals as well as employers lack information about programmes and policies. 
Picture 6 relies on the labour market factors affecting private training finance. One can 
assume that perceived high job security, high pay expectations and low expectation of 
unemployment will increase the probability of privately financed training. The question 
whether a competitive or a monopsony labour market improves or makes worse this 
probability is not immediately obvious but it appears to be reasonable that a competitive 
labour market, i.e. a labour market with many employers, is more attractive for individuals 
than markets with only one employer. The standpoint of an employer will be contradic-
tory, he will the more be willing to bear the costs of training (partially) if he is a mo-
nopsonist. 
labour markets monopsony oligopsony competitive
– –> +
job security expectation/perception no          low high
– –> +
pay expectation low high
– –> +
unemployment rate expectation high low
– –> +  
Picture 6: Labour market conditions and training finance 
Finally, the individual preparedness to pay for VET will depend on a very crucial factor, 
i.e. the individual ability to pay. If the individual or family income is not high enough to 
bear the costs of training private or public assistance is needed. According to theoretical 
as well as practical evidence one can assume that private credit markets will not be estab-
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lished or will depend on public securities. Besides the availability of finds the readiness to 
rely on these grants and loans is of major importance. If people refrain from taking up 
(interest-bearing) loans the existence of public and private support programs will not lead 
to higher access to VET. If people are highly risk averse they will refrain from taking up 
loans, they may also refrain from training. If people have a high preference for present 
consumption they will not opt for training since it is associated with a comparatively low 
income, i.e. if it is much lower than the wage payment for an unskilled job. 
By looking at the ability and willingness of the individual (trainee) to pay for VET one 
often overlooks that the individual is embedded into a family where parents may affect 
the decision due to their own or the family costs and benefits. As their benefits are com-
paratively low – except if they are very altruistic and / or a capital market is not available – 
they will often not be prepared to invest in their children's vocational education and train-
ing. 
risk aversity high low
– –> +
preference for future consumption low high
– –> +
access to private credit markets no          low good
– –> +
access to public loans no          low good
– –> +
access to public grants no          low good
– –> +
willingness to rely on private credits no          low good
– –> +
willingness to rely on public loans no          low good
– –> +
willingness to rely on public grants no          low good
– –> +  
Picture 7: The individual ability to pay and training finance 
The employer's decision to finance VET 
We can identify also a number of factors affecting the preparedness of the employer 
to bear the costs of VET. These factors can be differentiated by issues of the firm itself, 
the trainee and the particular training programme.  
If we look first at the firm itself, then the 'nature' of the firm is very important (see 
Picture 8). The probability of paying for VET is very low the more a firm is domestically 
oriented. In contrast, it will most probably be prepared to bear the costs of training the 
more it is an externally-oriented firm or even a joint venture or multi-national firm. The 
training preparedness increases also if firms are larger and/or the more they use modern 
technology. A crucial issue is the availability and the access to credit markets which is 
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generally easier for firms with a high profit rate. 
firm domestic joint-venture/multi-national
– –> +
company size micro            small medium large
– –> +
technology mature modern
– –> +
division of labour low high
– –> +
qualification requirements low high
– –> +
profit rate no high
– –> +
access to credits no very good
– –> +  
Picture 8: Factors affecting the firms' preparedness to pay for VET 
The firms' preparedness to pay for training depends also on some factors of the par-
ticular trainee. For example, the higher the pre-qualification or the job position of a 
worker the higher is the firm’s preparedness to pay for training. In contrast, disadvan-
taged individuals will experience fewer opportunities for training (see Picture 9). 
pre-qualification of work-force low high
– –> +
job-position low high
– –> +
individual disadvantaged advantaged
– –> +  
Picture 9: The trainee factors affecting the firms' preparedness to pay for VET 
training specificity general firm-specific
– –> +
training targeted at pre-employment in-service upgrading
– –> +
quality of training low high
– –> +
Product market orientation domestic internationally
– –> +
information about training programmeslow high
– –> +
duration of programmes long-term short-term
– –> +
programmes expensive low-cost
– –> +  
Picture 10: The training factors affecting the firms' preparedness to pay for VET 
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Picture 10 reviews the training factors influencing the willingness of the employer to 
bear the costs of training. The probability of firm-financed training is higher for firm-
specific training and for upgrading than for pre-employment training. High-quality train-
ing and good information about training opportunities raise the probability the same way 
as international orientation does with regard to product markets. 
In summary, short-term and low-cost programmes will be much more privately funded 
than long-term and expensive courses, e.g. for technicians. 
4. Market Failure and External Effects 
The question whether the government or public agencies should intervene in the edu-
cation market appears to be a very crucial discussion. There seems to be no general un-
derstanding whether VET is associated with external effects or not and whether they can 
justify public intervention. 
External effects are discussed in a number of areas which will be summarized in short 
in this chapter. 
Risk and Uncertainty of Individuals 
Training is a risky investment particularly for individuals. They never know whether they 
will get a job afterwards and they cannot reduce the risk by diversification. Even if people 
are risk-neutral the possibility of unemployment reduces the expected individual rates of 
return to training under the average rate. Thus, the social rate of return will be higher 
than the expected individual rate so that less than the optimal amount of people will opt 
for training.  
The higher the risk aversity of people the more will they refrain from training. The 
same is true the more people have to rely on their own income to finance livelihood, i.e. if 
a loan system is non existent or training wages are below subsistence level. 
In all these cases public intervention by reducing training costs might increase the 
number of trainees. The minimum intervention would be to introduce a loan scheme to 
refund training costs.  
Capital Market Imperfections 
Another widely accepted argument for public intervention is capital market imperfec-
tion. Due to moral hazard and adverse selection private capital markets will not be estab-
lished. Yet it has to be taken into account that such a scheme will not be accepted if 
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people are risk averse and that they have to face very high default rates. In some coun-
tries the default rates are so high that the introduction of a grant scheme would be less 
costly. 
It might have to be tested whether micro-lending is more successful as people would 
be more willing to repay their loan repayment if it enabled others to invest in education 
and training. 
Distributional and Social Aspects of Public Intervention 
There is a lot of agreement that some kind of public intervention is necessary for dis-
tributional and social reasons, e.g. equality of opportunity (e.g. see World Bank, 1991), 
even though this does not necessarily justify public provision. In designing such policies 
one should also consider their distortionary effects, i.e. the changes in relative prices. In 
any case, they have to be targeted to serve the disadvantaged.  
Poaching 
Poaching means that trained workers will be hired by other firms which have not in-
vested in training. Thus, they can offer a higher wage payment due to the saved training 
costs. The more competitive the labour markets are, and the more workers quit after 
training, the less will firms be prepared to bear the costs of training.7 In contrast, the 
longer workers stay with their firms and the less firms risk workers to quit the more will 
employers be prepared to invest in training.  
In summary, the poaching risk is depending on the particular labour market structure. 
In monopsonistic labour markets firm will provide training opportunities while in competi-
tive settings not. In the latter case firms will under-invest in skilled staff.  
One might expect that workers will invest in their own qualification if training markets 
are competitive because they will gain all the returns of training. A pre-condition is that 
they can afford the costs of training and pay for their livelihood.  
Economic Growth  
The upcoming of the endogenous growth theory has been a milestone for the discus-
sion on the contribution of education to economic growth in the last decade. Yet it is 
concerned with education in general and not with training, so that there is no informa-
tion as to how vocational education and training affects economic growth.  
                                               
 7  It might be sufficient that firms perceive a high risk that a worker quits after training. 
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Complementarities between General and Specific Training 
There is no specific training without (some kind of) general training and general train-
ing has to be complemented by specific training, so that they can be assumed to be com-
plements. Employers will not invest in specific training unless workers have sufficient gen-
eral training and workers will not invest in general training until they know that specific 
training will follow. If both parties lived in a world of security as regards long-lasting con-
tracts, employers might be willing to participate in the costs of general training because 
they will gain due to spillovers for specific training. If turnover is high they fear that they 
will not gain and they will not be prepared to pay, resulting in under-investment in train-
ing (Ritzen and Stern, 1991).  
 Brain Drain in Developing Countries 
An effect which seems to be more of economic relevance for developing than for al-
ready industrialised countries is human capital mobility. Brain drain is another kind of 
poaching which occurs if highly qualified and, thus, international competitive personnel 
moves to another country. An external effect arises if the country that invested in a per-
son, i.e. has borne the costs of education and training, receives no compensation by the 
country to which the worker moves. 
Summary: Is there a Case of Public Intervention in VET 
If we refer to the arguments in favour of public intervention mentioned in this section 
some of them appear to be strong. Yet in any case one has to investigate the overall ef-
fects of intervention policies as they might tend to make things worse. Intervention poli-
cies must be targeted to address and improve the problems they should solve. 
5. Financing vocational education and training 
The costs of VET can finally be borne by trainees (and their parents), employers 
and the government and it can take place in firms or at public or private VET-
institutions.8 All these three financiers can rely on past, present and future income to fi-
nance VET (see Table 1). 
                                               
 8  It has to be noted that it is not sufficient to rely on VET-funding only but that the financing of general education 
should also be considered because e.g. some distortionary effects may arise if the costs of individuals for general 
education are lower than for VET. 
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Financiers Present Income Future Income Past Income
Government Taxes and Fees Public Debt Selling of Public Property
Trainees/Students 
(Families)
All Kinds of Income 
(Salaries, Rent, 
Scholarships, Tax 
Reductions)
Credits, Loans
Withdrawing, 
Liquidisation of Property, 
Saving Accounts
Provider/
Institutions
Fees, Income Generation Credits, Loans
Withdrawing from Bank 
Accounts
Employers/
Companies
Income, Revenues, 
Turnover, Returns, Rent-, 
Interest-, Leasing-Income
Credits, Loans
Withdrawing from Bank 
Accounts
Employees
All Kinds of Income 
(Salaries, Rent, 
Scholarships, Tax 
Reductions)
Credits, Loans, Drawing 
rights
Withdrawing from Bank 
Accounts, Drawing 
rights
Source: Timmermann, 1999
Opportunities to finance education
 
Table 1: Sources of Liquidity and Financiers of VET-Funding 
Power (1999) refers to five funding sources: national budgets, employers’ contribu-
tions, learners’ contributions, voluntary contributions and self-funding. The latter com-
prises all activities which do not immediately refer to the training activities but are a by-
product of training or opportunities to generate income such as selling services to enter-
prises and perhaps alumni fund-raising (Moura Castro, 1999a) as well as evening courses 
and consultancy services (Fluitman, 1999; World Bank, 1991). Such activities might be 
restricted when the major task of these institutions, i.e. training, becomes neglected or if 
competing companies are disadvantaged due to subsidised production. An exemption 
might be production schools which combine training with other market activities. 
5.1 Trainee financed Training  
5.1.1 Wage Reductions 
In a traditionally private organised training system the trainee would get either no 
payment or a payment which is below his productivity. As far as the wage payment of the 
apprentice is below his productivity he bears the costs of training reducing the financial 
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burden of the employer. Such a low payment can be justified with the lower productivity 
of the trainer and/or other direct and indirect costs of training to be borne by the training 
firm. 
It depends on the specifity of the training how much of the costs will be recovered by 
the employers due to wage reductions. According to theory, firms are willing to contrib-
ute to general training while they share the costs of firm-specific (Becker, 1964, 1993; 
Dougherty and Tan, 1997). Some other factors, such as the structure of the training mar-
ket or the quit rates of graduates etc., will be important, too.  
Empirical research suggests that employers bear more of the costs as appears to be 
justified by the share of firm-specific training.9 
From the viewpoint of the trainee a wage reduction might be accepted as long as the 
remaining wage is sufficient to cover his maintenance costs. In any other case, the oppor-
tunity costs will become prohibitively high, so that no future return will be high enough to 
exceed the costs.  
5.1.2 Tuition and Apprenticeship Fees 
In a number of countries students or trainees have to pay a fee covering the total or a 
share of the training costs not only for classroom or school-based training but – as Ve-
lenchik (1995) reports for apprentices in Ghana – also in small enterprises for their train-
ing. According to Dougherty (1989) and Dougherty and Tan (1997) this is common in 
West Africa.  
The most common argument for a general introduction of fees is that the individuals 
gain monetary and non-monetary benefits from training while otherwise the firms or the 
government would have to bear the total costs. Some economists argue that only the 
trainees gain from training, so that they would have to bear the full costs of training.  
Other arguments in favour of fees are the expectation that they enhance the efficiency 
of training measures and contribute to the resources as well. Participants are likely to pay 
for training if it is of good quality and can bring personal benefits and high private rates 
of return (Bolina, 1996; Gasskov, 1994, 2000). Fees can be used to bring supply and de-
mand together as they can be raised if there is an excess in demand and can be reduced 
                                               
 9  For example, referring to Germany, it is said that the costs of training are higher than the returns for most training 
companies, thus incurring a loss (van Bardeleben and Beicht 1996). But it has to be taken into account that the re-
sults differ according to costs-concept, branch and company size. For example, the net costs are typically higher in 
technical areas than in service-oriented occupations; estimating the total costs of training for all companies inde-
pendent of size leads to net costs for all, whilst small companies gain a profit due to training if only the marginal 
costs of training are imputed.  
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if the supply is not fully demanded. Different fee levels can also be linked to different lev-
els of quality, if better institutes request a higher fee rate (Bolina, 1996). Yet the latter 
argument may exclude trainees from lower socio-economical backgrounds as they have 
difficulties in paying and thus to opt for a high quality education at expensive institutions. 
Therefore, the social consequences of differentiated fee system should be considered. 
Individual's Affordability of Fee Payments and Public Intervention Strategies 
The acceptance of loans and its (economic) rationale has to be questioned. It is gener-
ally assumed by economists that loans are in principal accepted by students or trainees 
and if not that better information would be able to overcome reservation. In this case, 
trainees would be prepared to take up a loan if the interest rate is below the (discounted) 
rate of return to training. The assumption holds only if trainees are risk neutral and / or if 
they are sure to benefit from training as expected. 
It should be noted that the discount rate for future earnings depends on an objective 
component – the interest rate – and the subjective component, the risk preference and 
the preference for present and future consumption. People who are risk averse will dis-
count future earnings more than risk neutral or risk loving people. This leads to compara-
tively low rates of return so that they will not take up a loan at a market interest rate. 
Even these assumptions demand a public subsidy because the interest rate for training 
loans would have to be higher than the market rate due to the higher risk of training in-
vestments. Thus, without public involvement the investment in training would be socially 
sub optimal. 
Furthermore, the interest rate has to be the more subsidised the more trainees are risk 
averse. Combined with the high default and deferment rates, it will most probably be 
more efficient to set up grants instead of loans. Loans might be a good instrument for 
trainees in highly prestigious courses and university students, but not for trainees in the 
informal sector or in training with an average reputation.  
Another mode would be the introduction of an individual training tax, meaning that a 
trained person would have to pay a higher (marginal) tax rate than an untrained person 
or would have to repay a certain share of his income to a recovering fund.10 If an income 
tax system is poorly developed and difficult to control it is difficult to organise a training 
credit system as a tax repayment. But it still might be an opportunity for some advanced 
                                               
 10  In recent years, research on student loans found that the deferment rate of income-related repayments are lower 
than of mortgage loans (Albrecht / Ziderman, 1991, World Bank, 1995). Based on this results education economists 
increasingly demand that loan repayments are to become income-related (West, 1994; Barr, 1989b; 1998) 
  22 
developing countries.  
An alternative to loan strategies, at least for trainees who are not prepared to take up 
interest bearing loans are scholarships or grant programmes. Compared to loan agree-
ments a grant does not negatively affect the preparedness of people from disadvantaged 
backgrounds, either socio-economically or locally, for training. It is an item of discussion 
whether fellowship programmes lead to more (Herschbach, 1993, quoted in Bolina, 1996) 
or less administration and management costs.  
5.2 Employer financed training 
5.2.1 Single Employer Funding 
According to Bolina (1996), vocational training in large companies in Japan is organ-
ised as a "single employer financing system". The large companies organise their own 
vocational training, and the expenditure for in-house training is considered part of the 
labour costs. In Japan the relationship between employers and employees is unique and 
often for the whole working life of a person. Due to the lifelong relationship the company 
can expect to earn the returns on training and will be prepared to bear the costs.  
Georg and Demes (1996) point out that these principles – which are quite often men-
tioned as the general principle of the Japanese labour market – are valid only for core 
staff but not for all employees. Furthermore, the training of an employee is strongly re-
lated to his tasks and duties but not to a general job qualification as, for example, in 
Germany. This can be regarded as firm-specific training (Becker, 1963, 1994), hindering 
workers in moving from one firm to another. Furthermore, the latter will receive a lower 
salary. 
As there is no report on whether the trainee is paid according to his or her marginal 
productivity or not, and whether the training expenditure is tax deductible or not, it has 
to be noted that the net costs to the employer is the important issue. The term “single 
employer's funding” would be misleading if cost-sharing occurs.  
5.2.2 Training Levy / Payroll Tax System 
Two general principles of a levy system can be distinguished. The first is that all com-
panies (of a particular branch) contribute to the fund with a certain share of their payroll 
to finance public provision of training institutions, the so-called revenue generating 
scheme. The second principle is that the levy is used either to repay the costs or to reduce 
the contribution of firms which train their staff. This is the so-called levy-rebate or levy-
grant scheme. The idea of the latter approach is to redistribute the training costs between 
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companies which train people and firms which do not.11  
Training levies have been introduced in several countries, particularly in Latin America 
and the Caribbean, e.g. in Brazil some 50 years ago. Other Latin American countries are 
Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Peru, and Venezuela. But training 
levies are not restricted to Latin America but, however, have been introduced around the 
world, e.g. Côte d’Ivoire imposed a levy in 1977 covering 1.5% of the wage bill. Compa-
nies which provide training opportunities do not have to contribute (Bas, 1988). Taiwan 
introduced a levy scheme in 1972, South Korea imposed it in 1974. 
The contribution in most countries is between 1.0 and 2.0% of the payroll and is typi-
cally paid by firms. In Venezuela the levy is 2.5%, also covering employee contributions. 
The contribution might differ between industries or be limited to certain branches. 
Dougherty and Tan (1997) point out that the levy scheme is restricted to the industrial 
sector in most countries. In just a few countries it also covers commerce, or is all-
embracing, like in Honduras. In general, small firms are exempted but with different defi-
nitions as to what a small firm is. Sometimes it comprises only large firms e.g. with more 
than 300 employees.  
According to Dougherty and Tan (1997) there is evidence that the net impact of the 
new programmes is not as impressive as appears to be at first glance. At first, the total 
expenditure on approved training schemes was 1% in Chile and 2% in Brazil although 
large firms contributed disproportionally to their numbers in the programme. Further-
more, they assumed that the training would have been undertaken anyway, so that the 
real impact of the programme would be rather low.12 
In Taiwan there was a discussion whether the introduction had worked like an ‘initial 
ignition’ as the number of trainees, which had more than tripled within 2 years and cov-
ered 8% of the labour force, has only been slightly reduced after the scheme was aban-
doned (Dougherty and Tan, 1997). Some, like San and Chao-Nan (1986), argue that the 
scheme might have had some kind of demonstration effect regarding the benefits of 
training.  
In Malaysia a training levy was established in 1993 with a matching government grant 
                                               
 11  This is different to a general tax reduction or tax rebate for companies which do not train people. If the training costs 
were to be included in the tax system, companies not providing training would not bear a part of the training costs. 
Instead, individuals would have to pay a part of the costs.11 
 12  This is stated also for South Korea (Booth and Snower, 1996), where the training levy relies on firms with more than 
300 workers which do not provide a sufficient percentage of their employees with training. Thus the levy is a panel 
tax for companies not providing sufficient training or spending to less for training. 
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(World Bank, 1997a; Tan and Gill, 2000). Employers contributing at least 6 months are 
entitled to claim a portion of their allowable training expenses up to the limit of their own 
levy which is 1% of the payroll. The levy is compulsory for all companies with more than 
50 workers, firms with up to 50 employees are under the umbrella of the ‘Double Deduc-
tion Incentive for Training’ Scheme (DDIT), which is a tax reduction (see chapter 5.3.2). 
Even if the levy is mandatory, roughly 27% of the firms are non-compliance, particularly 
small firms with less than 100 employees. The firms which are non-compliance avoid the 
payroll levy as well as the high fix costs for setting up a formal training programme if one 
is not already in existence which would enable them to get the expenses reimbursed. 
Thus, non-compliance is advantageous for small firms which do not intend to provide any 
or only informal training which is not covered by the levy system. 
It is reported that quite a number of firms pay the levy but do not claim for reim-
bursement. This can be explained only with the non-provision of training for a minority of 
6%. More than half train informally and are therefore not eligible, while 40% train for-
mally and would get reimbursed. That they do not apply for reimbursement is often be-
cause of low expenses and thus, a too low reimbursement compared to the costs of ap-
plication. This is also most relevant for small firms with mature technology needing low 
skill levels and weak training capabilities. 
Contrary to many other researchers, Dougherty and Tan (1997) are very reserved re-
garding the effects and the arguments in favour of a training levy. In their opinion, the 
arguments for the introduction of training levies are not very convincing as the trainees 
are the only one who benefit from training. So, they ask, why should companies contrib-
ute to the financing of training. 
An important question is whether the contribution to the levy scheme is really paid out 
of the firms’ profits or is shifted to purchasers via higher prices or workers by reduced 
wages. As the literature suggests for developed countries, the tax burden is shifted to the 
workers. Whalley and Ziderman (1990) assume that this is the case for developing coun-
tries as well. Thus, the payroll tax can be regarded as a reverse social insurance contribu-
tion, an income contingent loan or training tax because repayment depends on wage 
payment. Therefore, the higher the income, the higher the repayment. Finally it is unclear 
how far workers contribute to the scheme and how far they benefit from training. 
Dougherty and Tan (1997) point to three problems associated with a levy: (1) they see 
no reason to shelter the public funding of training more than e.g. general education, as it 
is often said to be the case of training levies; (2) the revenue from the levy is quite often 
much higher than the expenses, so that there is an incentive to increase administration or 
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to spend ineffectively; (3) all ear-marked taxes, and so for a levy as well, are subject to 
diversion and a misuse of funds.  
Some advantages of a levy, are, first, the general security of the availability of funds for 
training independent of changes in the economic environment. Secondly, a levy might be 
an opportunity to mobilise additional funds for public spending which are otherwise not 
available. Thirdly, it could be used not only for the promotion of training but also to re-
structure the labour force, e.g. as it intended in Singapore. The failure of the programme 
might be another argument against a levy.  
Levin (1977) has pointed to distortionary effects because a payroll tax increases the 
costs of labour compared the capital. Undesirable redistribution effects can be the higher 
taxation of labour income which is the most important source of income for the working 
poor and the middle class, while unearned income like rents, dividends, profits and in-
come which are major sources of the rich are unaffected. 
5.3 Public Financing of VET 
The important aspect of public funding is that it reduces the expenditure and costs of 
training to be borne by the immediate stakeholders, i.e. the companies providing and/or 
paying for training and the trainees (and their parents). 
One can distinguish between two major kinds of public subsidies: direct subsidies or 
payments and indirect transfers, like tax reductions. Public provision might be regarded as 
a special case of public funding as it is a direct public subsidy.  
5.3.1 Direct Payments/Subsidies out of Tax Revenues 
The financing of education as well as vocational education and training by tax reve-
nues is the main source of public spending all over the world. There are two major argu-
ments responsible for strong public intervention and financing. The first is the assumption 
that education and training is linked to large social benefits and the second is to ensure 
social equity for the poor in the rural and urban informal sector. Because public spending 
reduces the costs to be borne by the individuals it is suitable for providing training oppor-
tunities for socially disadvantaged groups, not only but also in deprived areas of the coun-
try (Bolina, 1996).  
As well as the economic rationale, a political argument of public spending for educa-
tion and training is the much stronger opportunity of public control, influence and restric-
tion.  
A direct subsidy is a common way to provide incentives for education. A general 
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mechanism is to bear the costs of public or private VET schools or to subsidise the wages 
of trainees.  
As Dougherty and Tan (1997) report, a number of, countries, particularly Asian, such 
as Sri Lanka, India or Nepal contribute to the wages of trainees even when they are carry-
ing out on-the-job training. Subsidizing off-the-job training for apprentices is reported for 
Fiji, New Zealand and Australia. 
5.3.2 Tax reductions / Tax rebates 
Tax reductions or tax rebates provide an incentive for firms to bear the costs of training 
by a reduction of the net-costs of training. According to Bolina (1996) a tax reduction is – 
like a payroll levy system – directed towards cost-sharing by those who benefit from train-
ing. Barr (1998, p. 325) mentions another and, for some tax systems, more important 
argument for tax deductible training costs: "Education, to the extent that is raises an indi-
vidual’s future earnings, increases her future tax payments; in absence of any subsidy, an 
individual’s investment in education confers a 'dividend' on future taxpayers." Thus, tax 
systems relying on individual earnings should declare training expenses as tax deductible 
or reduce training costs by subsidies. 
Dougherty and Tan (1997) point to some problematic topics of tax rebate schemes. 
Even if acknowledging that investments in physical and human capital are supposed to be 
treated equally they point out that the latter have typically better conditions of deprecia-
tion as it can be deducted with total or even more than total expenditure in the invest-
ment period while physical capital can be depreciated only over a couple of years. In 
combination with a progressive marginal tax system the higher marginal tax reduction of 
a one year depreciation leads to lower net investment costs. Such an investment becomes 
more favourable if more than the total expenditure can be deducted, e.g. in the Philip-
pines 150% of the expenditure are tax deductible, in Brazil 200%. 
The effect on the net costs of training depends on the applied modalities of tax reduc-
tion so that the general treatment of this issue in the literature is often somewhat confus-
ing as it is not specified which modalities are applied. One can distinguish between a re-
duction of the tax base and a reduction of the tax payment. The first one is a tax allow-
ance or tax exemption while the latter is a tax credit. Terms as tax rebates or tax reduc-
tions can cover both kinds so that they are not specific and thus open for confusion. 
A recent World Bank (1997a) study on Malaysia points to the poor performance of the 
‘Double Deduction Incentive for Training’ Scheme (DDIT) which allowed a tax deduction if 
firms send their workers to approved training courses. While small companies have more 
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or less not participated in the scheme, multi-national or joint-venture companies in par-
ticular have benefited. More than one third of the applications for approval of in-house 
training have been refused so that only 3,250 trainees within a 6-year period have been 
supported. Also the utilisation between the economic subsectors has been uneven. Indus-
trial firms (e.g. electrics, electronics, chemicals) have benefited most while programmes in 
food and beverage industries, wood and furniture or textiles have participated rather sel-
dom. 
As multi-national and joint-venture firms will train their staff even without such an in-
centive the programme missed its aim to encourage training provision. According to the 
authors, these findings confirm other studies pointing out the low cost-effectiveness of 
tax reduction policies (World Bank, 1997a). 
The most important reasons for not using the DDIT programmes were: no awareness 
of the programme (45%), no need or no provision of training (25%), not met require-
ments (11%), insufficient information about programme details (6%) or too few trainees 
(4%) and some other minor points. Thus, the most important problem was no or imper-
fect information, despite of great governmental efforts to inform about the availability, 
referred to by one out of two employers not applying to the programme. And one out of 
four employers were not in need of or currently not training or did not know how to 
train. Roughly 15% did not meet the requirements or trained too few people, thus apply-
ing would be of limited reward. 
Relating these results to firm size reveals that all issues are more relevant for small 
scale firms, even if large firms lack information or do not provide training, too. As already 
stated small scale firms provide less training than large companies (see also Lynch and 
Black, 1995), so that such a programme is immediately more targeted to the latter. On 
the other hand it means that other incentive policies are necessary to encourage small 
firms to engage in training.  
5.3.3 Public Provision of Training Institutions 
The most important subsidisation of training in most countries is the public provision of 
training institutions typically belonging to the formal educational system. These institu-
tions usually working under the immediate responsibility of the Ministry of Education or 
the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs or the National Training Authority.  
The major weakness of the public provided institutions compared to private ones is the 
weaker accountability of administrators and trainees of the former. A common finding of 
assessments of these institutions is their very low cost-effectiveness due to high unit costs, 
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insufficient use of available resources, failure to realise economies of scale and high ad-
ministrative overhead costs, poor maintenance of equipment etc. (Dougherty and Tan, 
1997). 
One difficulty regarding the question whether an institution is publicly provided or not 
seems to be a lack of a sound basis for evaluation. For example, Dougherty and Tan 
(1997) refer to the weaknesses of well-funded systems which, as they say, are typically 
financed by payroll levies. According to our distinction referring to ‘who is bearing the 
costs of training’, a levy scheme is financed by the employers so that it can not be re-
garded as a public financing scheme but a publicly administered institution or system if in 
line of a ministry.13 
If training institutions or a training system is organised under the responsibility of a Na-
tional Training Authority like the tripartite boards in Latin America, including government 
as well as representatives of the employers and employees, it is hardly a public body. This 
differentiation has to be taken into consideration while conducting the field studies for 
our investigation. 
5.3.4 Some General Remarks 
A common problem of all kinds of public subsidies is that they are difficult to target 
and to avoid windfall gains. Dougherty and Tan (1997) point out that professional and 
managerial workers have profited quite disproportionately in terms of numbers as well as 
costs of training.  
In some countries the introduction of subsidies had only a small impact on increasing 
training participation while companies which have been providing training even before 
the scheme was introduced have benefited most due to the reduced net costs. Thus, the 
net increase of training measures appears to be comparatively low. But up to now, ac-
cording to Dougherty and Tan (1997), no study has been carried out to investigate the 
impact of levy schemes or direct subsidies, so that the aforementioned findings are limited 
to tax reductions.  
On the contrary, they point out that much enterprise-sponsored training remains out 
of range, because of high administrative costs possibly exceeding the benefits of the sub-
sidy either to set up a programme or to redirect a programme to become eligible for the 
                                               
 13  It has to be acknowledged that this distinction is not without any difficulty as in the end all public funding is funding 
by private sources as any tax is paid by private individuals. A more sound distinction might be whether a tax or, more 
generally, a contribution is ear-marked, like a training levy, or not, as income tax or VAT disappearing in the public 
budget. 
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subsidy. 
Another effect is that programmes are redirected to meet the eligibility criteria for the 
subsidy, e.g. by extending the duration of a course if a minimum duration is required etc. 
Concluding, each subsidy programme that is directed towards certain target groups or 
areas of training etc. contains the risk of becoming ineffective while each unspecified 
programme risks high public expenditure and low additional training provision. In both 
cases the cost-effectiveness of the programme would be less than optimal.  
Dougherty and Tan (1997) stress the problems of minimum wage legislation which 
might increase training wages to a too high level, and therefore either undermining train-
ing provision by firms or hindering that trainees bear an appropriate share of the costs. 
Another issue in increasing the number of trainees in companies could be the exclusion of 
trainees from social security contributions or payments. 
If it is necessary or advantageous to improve training provision by private companies, 
Dougherty and Tan (1997) favour working contracts committing trainees to work for their 
training company for a certain period after graduation for a below-market wage. 
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